Activity: Organising and attending an event (fka Participating in or organising an event) › Attending an event (fka Participation in conference) › Academic
Abstract: Most contemporary (analytic) philosophers reject subjectivism about meaning in life: the view that a life is meaningful to the extent that the subject's desires or goals are realized, or the subject is fulfilled (Taylor, Wolf, Metz, Bramble, Smuts, Kauppinen). In spite of the near consensus in favour of objectivist theories, a few philosophers hold on to (some version of) subjectivism, such as Frankfurt and Luper. But one often looks in vain for a more or less principled motivation. Thaddeus Metz thinks the main motivation for subjectivism consists of metaphysical suspicions about objective value. I think there are three reasons why denying the existence of objective value is a poor motivation for subjectivism about meaning: (1) even if objective values don't exist, they may still be required for a meaningful life. (2) Saying that objective values don't exist does not address the examples and reasons provided against subjectivism. (3) One can consistently embrace both a subjectivist metaphysics of value and a non-subjectivist view about the meaning of life, as I will argue in this paper. The overall aim is to provide a better motivation for a broadly subjectivist view about meaning.