A Game-Theoretic Approach to Peer Disagreement

Remco Heesen, Pieter van der Kolk*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)
193 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

In this paper we propose and analyze a game-theoretic model of the epistemology of peer disagreement. In this model, the peers' rationality is evaluated in terms of their probability of ending the disagreement with a true belief. We find that different strategies-in particular, one based on the Steadfast View and one based on the Conciliatory View-are rational depending on the truth-sensitivity of the individuals involved in the disagreement. Interestingly, the Steadfast and the Conciliatory Views can even be rational simultaneously in some circumstances. We tentatively provide some reasons to favor the Conciliatory View in such cases. We argue that the game-theoretic perspective is a fruitful one in this debate, and this fruitfulness has not been exhausted by the present paper.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1345-1368
Number of pages24
JournalErkenntnis
Volume81
Issue number6
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Dec-2016

Keywords

  • Peer disagreement
  • Rationality
  • Formal epistemology
  • Game theory
  • Social epistemology

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