Abstract
A
modest
solution
to
the
problem(s)
of
rule-following
is
defended
against
Kripkensteinian
scepticism
about
meaning.
Even
though
parts
of
it
generalise
to
other
concepts,
the
theory
as
a
whole
applies
to
response-dependent
concepts
only.
It
is
argued
that
the
finiteness
problem
is
not
nearly
as
pressing
for
such
concepts
as
it
may
be
for
some
other
kinds
of
concepts.
Furthermore,
the
modest
theory
uses
a
notion
of
justification
as
sensitivity
to
countervailing
conditions
in
order
to
solve
the
justification
problem.
Finally,
in
order
to
solve
the
normativity
problem,
it
relies
on
substantial
specifications
of
normal
conditions
such
as
those
that
have
been
proposed
by
Crispin
Wright
and
Mark
Johnston,
rather
than
on
Philip
Pettit's
functionalist
specification.
This
theory
is
modest
in
that
it
does
not
meet
the
demands
of
Kripke's
sceptic
in
full.
Arguments
are
provided
as
to
why
this
is
not
needed.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 65-98 |
| Number of pages | 34 |
| Journal | Philosophical Studies |
| Volume | 121 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| Publication status | Published - Oct-2004 |
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