Aesthetic properties, mind-independence, and companions in guilt

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Abstract

I first show how one might argue for a mind-independent conception of beauty and artistic merit. I then discuss whether this makes aesthetic judgements suitable to undermine skeptical worries about the existence of mind-independent moral value and categorical reasons.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationCompanions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics
EditorsChristopher Cowie, Richard Rowland
Place of PublicationLondon
PublisherRoutledge
Chapter9
ISBN (Electronic)9780429454677
ISBN (Print)9781138318335
Publication statusPublished - 1-Oct-2019

Keywords

  • aesthetic properties
  • objectivity
  • companions in guilt arguments
  • evolutionary debunking

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