Abstract
This paper introduces Agreement Theorems to dynamic-epistemic logic. We show first that common belief of posteriors is sufficient for agreement in epistemic-plausibility models, under common and well-founded priors. We do not restrict ourselves to the finite case, showing that in countable structures the results hold if and only if the underlying plausibility ordering is well-founded. We then show that neither well-foundedness nor common priors are expressible in the language commonly used to describe and reason about epistemic-plausibility models. The static agreement result is, however, finitely derivable in an extended modal logic. We provide the full derivation. We finally consider dynamic agreement results. We show they have a counterpart in epistemic-plausibility models, and provide a new form of agreements via public announcements.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 735-764 |
Number of pages | 30 |
Journal | Journal of Philosophical Logic |
Volume | 41 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Aug-2012 |
Keywords
- Agreement theorems
- Dynamic-epistemic logic
- Information
- Belief revision
- Fixed-point logic
- Hybrid logic
- DISAGREE