Agreement Theorems in Dynamic-Epistemic Logic

Cedric Degremont*, Oliver Roy*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

8 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper introduces Agreement Theorems to dynamic-epistemic logic. We show first that common belief of posteriors is sufficient for agreement in epistemic-plausibility models, under common and well-founded priors. We do not restrict ourselves to the finite case, showing that in countable structures the results hold if and only if the underlying plausibility ordering is well-founded. We then show that neither well-foundedness nor common priors are expressible in the language commonly used to describe and reason about epistemic-plausibility models. The static agreement result is, however, finitely derivable in an extended modal logic. We provide the full derivation. We finally consider dynamic agreement results. We show they have a counterpart in epistemic-plausibility models, and provide a new form of agreements via public announcements.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)735-764
Number of pages30
JournalJournal of Philosophical Logic
Volume41
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Aug-2012

Keywords

  • Agreement theorems
  • Dynamic-epistemic logic
  • Information
  • Belief revision
  • Fixed-point logic
  • Hybrid logic
  • DISAGREE

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