Akrasia, dispositions and degrees (Philosophy of mind)

J Peijnenburg*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

7 Citations (Scopus)


It is argued that the recent revival of the akrasia problem in the philosophy of mind is a direct, albeit unforeseen result of the debate on action explanation in the philosophy of science. A solution of the problem is put forward that takes account of the intimate links between the problem of akrasia and this debate. This solution is based on the idea that beliefs and desires have degrees of strength, and it suggests a way of giving a precise meaning to that idea. Finally, it is pointed out that the solution captures certain intuitions of both Socrates and Aristotle.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)285-308
Number of pages24
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 2000


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