Alexandre Koyré: "The dog that is a heavenly constellation and the dog that is a barking animal" (1950): Introduction and Translation

Oberto Marrama

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)
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Abstract

One of the most important and fascinating claims in Spinoza’s philosophical system is the identification of the human mind with a part of God’s infinite intellect (Ethics II, prop. 11, cor.). However, this identification is challenged by a long and complicated scholium in the first part of the Ethics (prop. 17, schol.). In that scholium Spinoza writes that “God’s intellect, insofar as it is conceived to constitute God’s essence, is really the cause both of the essence and of the existence of things. […] Therefore it must necessarily differ from them both as to its essence and as to its existence. […] But God’s intellect is the cause both of the essence and of the existence of our intellect. Therefore, God’s intellect, insofar as it is conceived to constitute the divine essence, differs from our intellect both as to its essence and as to its existence, and cannot agree with it in anything except in name”—as in fact do the dog that is a heavenly constellation and the dog that is a barking animal. The correct interpretation of this peculiar scholium is the aim of Alexandre Koyré’s article.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)95-108
Number of pages14
JournalThe Leibniz Review
Volume24
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Dec-2014
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Spinoza
  • Intellect
  • Will
  • God

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