Abstract
In more and more contexts, human decision-making is replaced by algorithmic decision-making. While promising to deliver efficient and objective decisions, algorithmic decision systems have specific weaknesses, some of which are particularly dangerous if data are collected and processed by profit-oriented companies. In this paper, I focus on two problems that are at the root of the logic of algorithmic decision-making: (1) (in)tolerance for ambiguity, and (2) instantiations of Campbell’s law, i. e. of indicators that are used for “social decision-making” being subject to “corruption pressures” and tending to “distort and corrupt” the underlying social processes. As a result, algorithmic decision-making can risk missing the point of the social practice in question. These problems are intertwined with problems of structural injustice; hence, if algorithms are to deliver on their promises of efficiency and objectivity, accountability and critical scrutiny are needed.
Original language | German |
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Pages (from-to) | 197–213 |
Number of pages | 17 |
Journal | Deutsche Zeitschrift fur Philosophie |
Volume | 69 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 18-Apr-2021 |