Assessing the baseline bargaining model in the civil conflicts of Slovenia (1991) and Sierra Leone (1991-1996): a reappraisal

Karsten de Bruijne

    Research output: Contribution to conferencePosterAcademic


    This paper assesses the extent to which the rationalist claims of the
    baseline bargaining model find confirmation in the civil conflicts of
    Slovenia (1991) and Sierra Leone (1991-1996). It finds rational
    subjective probability estimates with aleatoric and subjective
    characteristics and Bayesian learning and screening with an adaptive and
    efficient character in the civil conflict in Slovenia which confirms the
    general set-up of the bargaining model. Whereas the harder case of
    Sierra Leone does confirm the relevance of uncertainty and divergent
    expectations for war onset and dynamics, it however raises questions
    over the reach of the model’s Bayesian character. This paper proposes
    broadening the model to account for divergence of beliefs during
    conflict and asks whether it is theoretically too far stretched to assume
    that the Sierra Leone actors held common first-order beliefs.
    Original languageEnglish
    Number of pages32
    Publication statusPublished - 2012
    EventMidwestern Political Science Association (MPSA) - Chicago, Chicago, United States
    Duration: 12-Apr-201214-Apr-2012


    ConferenceMidwestern Political Science Association (MPSA)
    Country/TerritoryUnited States

    Cite this