In his Contra Academicos, Augustine offers one of the most detailed responses to scepticism to have come down to us from antiquity. In this paper, I examine Augustine’s defence of the existence of infallible knowledge in Contra Academicos 3. I challenge a number of established views concerning the nature and merit of Augustine’s defence of knowledge and propose a new understanding of Augustine’s response to scepticism and several important elements of Augustine’s thought concerning signification, cognition, and object-directed thought. I argue that once we understand Augustine’s views about these issues properly, his arguments in defence of knowledge are more interesting and more successful than usually thought.
|Title of host publication||Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy|
|Publisher||Oxford University Press|
|Number of pages||51|
|ISBN (Print)||9780198851059, 9780198851011|
|Publication status||Published - 2019|
|Name||Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy|