Augustine's Defence of Knowledge against the Sceptics

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterAcademicpeer-review


In his Contra Academicos, Augustine offers one of the most detailed responses to scepticism to have come down to us from antiquity. In this paper, I examine Augustine’s defence of the existence of infallible knowledge in Contra Academicos 3. I challenge a number of established views concerning the nature and merit of Augustine’s defence of knowledge and propose a new understanding of Augustine’s response to scepticism and several important elements of Augustine’s thought concerning signification, cognition, and object-directed thought. I argue that once we understand Augustine’s views about these issues properly, his arguments in defence of knowledge are more interesting and more successful than usually thought.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationOxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy
EditorsVictor Caston
PublisherOxford University Press
Number of pages51
ISBN (Print)9780198851059, 9780198851011
Publication statusPublished - 2019

Publication series

NameOxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy
ISSN (Print)0265-7651

Cite this