Abstract
An important question confronting feminist philosophers is why women are sometimes complicit in their own subordination. The dominant view holds that complicity is best understood in terms of adaptive preferences. This view assumes that agents will naturally gravitate away from subordination and towards flourishing as long as they do not have things imposed on them that disrupt this trajectory. However, there is reason to believe that ‘impositions’ do not explain all of the ways in which complicity can arise. This paper defends a phenomenological account of complicity, which offers an alternative explanation.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 1-18 |
Number of pages | 18 |
Journal | European Journal of Philosophy |
DOIs | |
Publication status | E-pub ahead of print - 23-Nov-2021 |
Keywords
- Complicity
- Phenomenology
- Heidegger
- Adaptive Preferences
- Responsibility
- Freedom
- Feminist Philosophy
- Beauvoir
- Sartre
- Subordination
- Oppression