Abstract
The functioning of the European Union (EU) has been explored extensively in recent years. The dominant prism
through which to look at the EU is still one of locus: i.e. whether decisions are made in the capitals of its
member states or in Brussels. This debate is contained in the dualism between intergovernmentalism and
supranationalism, but drawing the boundaries between the two concepts is still undone. This article attempts to
contribute to solving this problem by investigating the restrictive measures policy of the EU in order to identify
three conditions under which intergovernmentalism should be used. First, when EU institutions are dependent
on EU member states for information and expertise; second, when decision-making powers rest mainly in EU
capitals; and three, when there are no exclusive fora for decision-making in Brussels. The study of the restrictive
measures of the European Union does not meet any of these three conditions; therefore the article argues that the
concept of supranational intergovernmentalism offers useful insights to understand the EU security governance
of CFSP sanctions. The article is divided into four parts. The first introduces the debate on security governance
and justifies the selection of this specific approach to the study of sanctions. The second part presents the
restrictive measures policy of the European Union and justifies its pertinence to the field of security. The third
part of the article investigates the emerging patterns in security governance by testing the three conditions on the
decision-making process for EU restrictive measures. Finally, the conclusion summarises the main argument
and indicates ways forward in the study of EU sanctions from a governance perspective.
through which to look at the EU is still one of locus: i.e. whether decisions are made in the capitals of its
member states or in Brussels. This debate is contained in the dualism between intergovernmentalism and
supranationalism, but drawing the boundaries between the two concepts is still undone. This article attempts to
contribute to solving this problem by investigating the restrictive measures policy of the EU in order to identify
three conditions under which intergovernmentalism should be used. First, when EU institutions are dependent
on EU member states for information and expertise; second, when decision-making powers rest mainly in EU
capitals; and three, when there are no exclusive fora for decision-making in Brussels. The study of the restrictive
measures of the European Union does not meet any of these three conditions; therefore the article argues that the
concept of supranational intergovernmentalism offers useful insights to understand the EU security governance
of CFSP sanctions. The article is divided into four parts. The first introduces the debate on security governance
and justifies the selection of this specific approach to the study of sanctions. The second part presents the
restrictive measures policy of the European Union and justifies its pertinence to the field of security. The third
part of the article investigates the emerging patterns in security governance by testing the three conditions on the
decision-making process for EU restrictive measures. Finally, the conclusion summarises the main argument
and indicates ways forward in the study of EU sanctions from a governance perspective.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 390-405 |
Number of pages | 15 |
Journal | Journal of Contemporary European Research |
Volume | 9 |
Issue number | 3 |
Publication status | Published - 2013 |
Externally published | Yes |