Bribing potential entrants in a rent-seeking contest

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Abstract

We consider a two-stage model of a Tullock rent-seeking contest where one new potential entrant makes his appearance. In the first stage each other player can contribute to bribe this new player to commit not to enter the contest. In the second stage we have the actual contest either with or without the new player. We present the conditions such that there exist equilibria in which the new player is being bribed.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)153-158
Number of pages6
JournalPublic Choice
Volume139
Issue number1-2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr-2009

Keywords

  • Rent-seeking contest
  • Entry
  • Bribing
  • 2ND-PRICE AUCTIONS
  • PUBLIC-GOODS
  • PROVISION

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