CEO career horizon and corporate bribery: a strategic relationship perspective

Jiasi Fan, Zhexiong Tao*, Jana Oehmichen, Hans van Ees

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)
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We investigate the impact of CEO career horizon on corporate bribery. Based upon the research on time horizon of corporate investments, we argue that bribery may be implemented as an investment in strategic relationships with long-term motivations in emerging markets and, for that matter, CEOs with longer career horizons rather than shorter career horizons are more likely to make bribery investments. Using a sample of 2,914 Chinese listed companies from 2010 to 2018, we find support for the argument. The finding challenges the long-held assumption that short-term oriented CEOs are prone to paying bribes. Further, we augment the research by expounding upon the way that state ownership moderates the relationship between CEO career horizon and firm bribery investment.

Original languageEnglish
JournalAsia Pacific Journal of Management
Early online date12-Jan-2023
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 12-Jan-2023


  • CEO career horizon
  • Corporate bribery
  • Corporate investment
  • Non-market strategy
  • Strategic relationship

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