Choosing Beauty

Simon Friederich*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

Reasoning that takes into account self-locating evidence in apparently plausible ways sometimes yields the startling conclusion that rational credences are such as if agents had bizarre causal powers. The present paper introduces a novel version of the Sleeping Beauty problem-Choosing Beauty-for which the response to the problem advocated by David Lewis unappealingly yields this conclusion. Furthermore, it suggests as a general desideratum for approaches to problems of self-locating belief that they should not recommend credences that are as if anyone had anomalous causal powers. Adopting this desideratum, as the paper shows, yields uniformly plausible verdicts on the most-discussed problems of self-locating belief.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)449-463
Number of pages15
JournalLogique et Analyse
Volume60
Issue number240
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2017

Keywords

  • Doomsday Argument
  • Sleeping Beauty
  • self-locating belief
  • anomalous causal powers
  • SELF-LOCATING BELIEFS
  • SLEEPING-BEAUTY
  • DOOMSDAY ARGUMENT
  • DOUBLE-HALFERS
  • DYNAMICS
  • FUTURE
  • ELGA
  • EVIL
  • ODDS

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