TY - JOUR
T1 - Climate Policy with Technology Transfers and Permit Trading
AU - Helm, Carsten
AU - Pichler, S.
PY - 2015
Y1 - 2015
N2 - In this paper, we analyze technology transfers (TT) and tradable emission rights, which are core issues of the ongoing climate negotiations. Subsidizing TT leads to the adoption of better abatement technologies in developing countries, thereby reducing the international permit price. This is bene cial for industrialized countries as long as they are permit buyers, and as long as they can target subsidies to additional" investments. We also consider how TT aects countries' non-cooperative choices of permit endowments and nd that it reduces overall emissions. Finally, a simple numerical simulation model illustrates some results and explores some further comparative statics.
AB - In this paper, we analyze technology transfers (TT) and tradable emission rights, which are core issues of the ongoing climate negotiations. Subsidizing TT leads to the adoption of better abatement technologies in developing countries, thereby reducing the international permit price. This is bene cial for industrialized countries as long as they are permit buyers, and as long as they can target subsidies to additional" investments. We also consider how TT aects countries' non-cooperative choices of permit endowments and nd that it reduces overall emissions. Finally, a simple numerical simulation model illustrates some results and explores some further comparative statics.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?eid=2-s2.0-84943588410&partnerID=MN8TOARS
U2 - 10.1007/s10640-013-9756-6
DO - 10.1007/s10640-013-9756-6
M3 - Article
SN - 1573-1502
VL - 60
SP - 37
EP - 54
JO - Environmental and Resource Economics
JF - Environmental and Resource Economics
ER -