Collective Responsibility and Acting Together

Olle Blomberg, Frank Hindriks

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What is the moral significance of the contrast between acting together and strategic interaction? We argue that while collective moral responsibility is not uniquely tied to the former, the degree to which the participants in a shared intentional wrongdoing are blameworthy is normally higher than when agents bring about the same wrong as a result of strategic interaction. One argument for this claim focuses on the fact that shared intentions cause intended outcomes in a more robust manner than the intentions involved in strategic interaction. We argue, however, that this in itself is not significant. The significant difference is rather volitional: The parties to a shared intention are mutually implicated in each other’s will in a distinct way. Since degree of blameworthiness depends on the quality of will an agent displays in her actions, this explains the higher degree of collective blameworthiness associated with shared intentional wrongdoing.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationThe Routledge Handbook on Collective Responsibility
EditorsSaba Bazargan-Forward, Deborah Tollefsen
Number of pages13
ISBN (Electronic)9781315107608
ISBN (Print)9781138092242
Publication statusPublished - 2020

Publication series

NameRoutledge Handbooks in Philosophy

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