Abstract
We survey research on incurring commitments by voluntary hostage posting as a mechanism
of cooperation. The Trust Game is employed as a paradigmatic example of cooperation
problems. We sketch a very simple game-theoretic model that shows how voluntary
hostage posting can bind the trustee and thus induce trustfulness of the trustor as well
as trustworthiness of the trustee. We then indicate how the model can be improved by
including uncertainty and incomplete information, transaction costs of hostage posting
and compensating effects as well as signaling effects of hostages. Further extensions
of the theoretical analysis are outlined as well as testable hypotheses and references to
empirical research. Problems for future research are suggested.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Perspectives in Moral Science |
Editors | M. Baurmann, B. Lahno |
Place of Publication | Frankfurt am Main |
Pages | 207-225 |
Number of pages | 19 |
Publication status | Published - 2009 |