In the chapter I discuss compromises in ethical conflict and disagreement with respect to public decisions between conflicting incommensurable valuable alternatives. I argue that in some cases incommensurability prevents a principled compromise, which is defined as a rational way to achieve a trade-off or balance between conflicting values. Incommensurable values, which are usually at stake in the pursuit of a compromise, lack an equivalence relation, which prevents a determinate trade-off or balance between them. This is especially problematic with respect to the pursuit of compromises in ethical conflicts, including conflicts of justice, where we need a rational and ethical justification for the final decision. I will show how a deliberative democratic procedure can make the final decision legitimate but that, in the relevant cases, it cannot avoid an ethical deficit.
|Title of host publication||Compromises in Democracy|
|Editors||Sandrine Baume, Stéphanie Novak|
|Number of pages||27|
|Publication status||Published - 2020|
|Name||Palgrave Studies in Compromise after Conflict |
- ethical conflict