Confirmation based on analogical inference: Bayes meets Jeffrey

Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla*, Alexander Gebharter

*Corresponding author for this work

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Certain hypotheses cannot be directly confirmed for theoretical, practical, or moral reasons. For some of these hypotheses, however, there might be a workaround: confirmation based on analogical reasoning. In this paper we take up Dardashti, Hartmann, Thébault, and Winsberg’s (2019) idea of analyzing confirmation based on analogical inference Bayesian style. We identify three types of confirmation by analogy and show that Dardashti et al.’s approach can cover two of them. We then highlight possible problems with their model as a general approach to analogical inference and argue that these problems can be avoided by supplementing Bayesian update with Jeffrey conditionalization.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)174-194
Number of pages21
JournalCanadian Journal of Philosophy
Issue number2
Early online date20-Nov-2019
Publication statusPublished - Feb-2020

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