Consensus via multi-population robust mean-field games

D. Bauso*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)
15 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

In less prescriptive environments where individuals are told 'what to do' but not 'how to do', synchronization can be a byproduct of strategic thinking, prediction, and local interactions. We prove this in the context of multi-population robust mean-field games. The model sheds light on a multi-scale phenomenon involving fast synchronization within the same population and slow inter-cluster oscillation between different populations. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)76-83
Number of pages8
JournalSystems & Control Letters
Volume107
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sep-2017
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Synchronization
  • Consensus
  • Mean-field games
  • SYNCHRONIZATION
  • EQUILIBRIA
  • SYSTEMS

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