Debunking Confabulation: Emotions and the Significance of Empirical Psychology for Kantian Ethics

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Abstract

It is frequently argued that research findings in empirical moral psychology spell trouble for Kantian ethics. Sometimes the charge is merely that Kantianism is mistaken about the role of emotions in human action, but it has also been argued that empirical moral psychology ‘debunks’ Kantian ethics as the product of precisely the emotion-driven processes it fails to acknowledge. In this essay I argue for a negative and a positive thesis. The negative thesis is that the ‘debunking’ argument against Kantian ethics is invalid because it begs the central question. The positive thesis is that, because the empirical facts about human moral psychology are morally significant, Kantians can and should wholeheartedly embrace the current interest in this area of empirical research. As Kant himself emphasized, it is an indirect, imperfect duty to use available knowledge of morally relevant empirical psychological conditions and to put this in the service of moral agency.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationKant on Emotion and Value
EditorsAlix Cohen
Place of PublicationBasingstoke
PublisherPalgrave MacMillan
Pages146-165
ISBN (Print)9781137276643
Publication statusPublished - 2014

Keywords

  • Kant
  • MORAL PSYCHOLOGY
  • Kantian ethics
  • debunking arguments

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