Delegation with multiple instruments in a rent-seeking contest

Lambert Schoonbeek

Delegation with multiple instruments in a rent-seeking contest

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Abstract

Abstract : We consider delegation in a rent-seeking contest with two players, where delegates have more instruments at their disposal than the main players. We endogenize both the decision to hire a delegate and the contingent fee offered to the delegates. We characterize the situations when either no, one or two players hire a delegate in equilibrium. We show that the decision to hire a delegate depends in a non-monotone way on the size of the contested prize.

Original language	English
Place of Publication	Groningen
Publisher	University of Groningen, SOM research school
Number of pages	18
Volume	SOM Research Reports
Edition	06E11
Publication status	Published - 2006

Keywords

multiple instruments.
delegation
contest

Access to Document

06C11_Schoonbeek.pdfFinal publisher's version, 169 KB

Cite this

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