Delegation with multiple instruments in a rent-seeking contest

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Abstract

Abstract : We consider delegation in a rent-seeking contest with two players, where delegates have more instruments at their disposal than the main players. We endogenize both the decision to hire a delegate and the contingent fee offered to the delegates. We characterize the situations when either no, one or two players hire a delegate in equilibrium. We show that the decision to hire a delegate depends in a non-monotone way on the size of the contested prize.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationGroningen
PublisherUniversity of Groningen, SOM research school
Number of pages18
VolumeSOM Research Reports
Edition06E11
Publication statusPublished - 2006

Keywords

  • multiple instruments.
  • delegation
  • contest

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