TY - GEN
T1 - Demand-Side Management in a Micro-Grid with Multiple Retailers
T2 - 2021 European Control Conference, ECC 2021
AU - Mendoza, Fernando Genis
AU - Baldivieso-Monasterios, Pablo R.
AU - Bauso, Dario
AU - Konstantopoulos, George
N1 - Funding Information:
Sponsored by Mexico's CONACyT, scholarship number: 440742. This work is supported by EPSRC under Grants No EP/S001107/1 and EP/S031863/1.
Funding Information:
This work is supported by EPSRC under Grants No EP/S001107/1 and EP/S031863/1.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 EUCA.
PY - 2022/1/3
Y1 - 2022/1/3
N2 - This paper deals with the design and analysis of a novel on-line pricing mechanism based on coalitional game theory. The proposed architecture consists of a micro-grid (MG) where the power demand can be fulfilled by multiple competing energy retailers trying to attract consumers by announcing a price in a hierarchical leader-follower structure. The existence of a Stackelberg equilibrium in such game is shown, leading to a guaranteed consumption value given a price. The coalition formation is then extended to a minimum spanning tree game that affects the rational decision of the players involved. The stability analysis for the resulting coalitions is performed and the steps in the game are presented. Simulations provide a comparison of the profits generated by the proposed scheme against a more traditional single retailer scheme, while simultaneously showing convergence towards steady-state equilibrium.
AB - This paper deals with the design and analysis of a novel on-line pricing mechanism based on coalitional game theory. The proposed architecture consists of a micro-grid (MG) where the power demand can be fulfilled by multiple competing energy retailers trying to attract consumers by announcing a price in a hierarchical leader-follower structure. The existence of a Stackelberg equilibrium in such game is shown, leading to a guaranteed consumption value given a price. The coalition formation is then extended to a minimum spanning tree game that affects the rational decision of the players involved. The stability analysis for the resulting coalitions is performed and the steps in the game are presented. Simulations provide a comparison of the profits generated by the proposed scheme against a more traditional single retailer scheme, while simultaneously showing convergence towards steady-state equilibrium.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85124905475&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.23919/ECC54610.2021.9654839
DO - 10.23919/ECC54610.2021.9654839
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85124905475
T3 - 2021 European Control Conference, ECC 2021
SP - 347
EP - 352
BT - 2021 European Control Conference, ECC 2021
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Y2 - 29 June 2021 through 2 July 2021
ER -