Different reactions to adverse neighborhoods in games of cooperation

Chunyan Zhang*, Jianlei Zhang, Franz J. Weissing, Matjaz Perc, Guangming Xie, Long Wang

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

14 Citations (Scopus)
201 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

In social dilemmas, cooperation among randomly interacting individuals is often difficult to achieve. The situation changes if interactions take place in a network where the network structure jointly evolves with the behavioral strategies of the interacting individuals. In particular, cooperation can be stabilized if individuals tend to cut interaction links when facing adverse neighborhoods. Here we consider two different types of reaction to adverse neighborhoods, and all possible mixtures between these reactions. When faced with a gloomy outlook, players can either choose to cut and rewire some of their links to other individuals, or they can migrate to another location and establish new links in the new local neighborhood. We find that in general local rewiring is more favorable for the evolution of cooperation than emigration from adverse neighborhoods. Rewiring helps to maintain the diversity in the degree distribution of players and favors the spontaneous emergence of cooperative clusters. Both properties are known to favor the evolution of cooperation on networks. Interestingly, a mixture of migration and rewiring is even more favorable for the evolution of cooperation than rewiring on its own. While most models only consider a single type of reaction to adverse neighborhoods, the coexistence of several such reactions may actually be an optimal setting for the evolution of cooperation.

Original languageEnglish
Article numbere35183
Number of pages7
JournalPLoS ONE
Volume7
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 23-Apr-2012

Keywords

  • PRISONERS-DILEMMA GAME
  • EVOLUTIONARY GAMES
  • COMPLEX NETWORKS
  • SOCIAL NETWORKS
  • ACTIVE LINKING
  • INDIVIDUALS
  • DYNAMICS
  • COEVOLUTION
  • EMERGENCE
  • GRAPHS

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