Abstract
Discretion is a widely used element of illiberal reforms. In analytical debates about the rule of law crisis in Europe, however, it is often largely overlooked. By exploring the role of discretionary decision making in the context of autocratic reforms, this investigation seeks to elucidate this blind spot. It draws attention the specific benefits that discretion engenders for autocratic lawmakers, both at strategic and practical level. Strategically, discretion acts as a disguise for the illiberal intentions of autocratic lawmakers, permitting them to benefit from an air of lawfulness while carrying on with an autocratic agenda. On a practical level, discretion resonates with a measure of executive freedom that is rather easily abused for autocratic purposes. While this investigation explains the utility that many autocrats see in discretion, it likewise accentuates the false pretences on which autocrats’ use of discretionary power is based and the ways in which European courts have dispelled autocratic strategies that centred on discretionary powers.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 963-976 |
Number of pages | 14 |
Journal | Revue des affaires européennes |
Volume | 2023 |
Issue number | 4 |
Publication status | Published - 2024 |
Keywords
- discretion
- rule of law
- autocratic legalism
- refugee crisis
- European Court of Justice