Abstract
We study a distributed allocation process where,
at each time, every player i) proposes a new bid based on
the average utilities produced up to that time, ii) adjusts such
allocations based on the inputs received from its neighbors, and
iii) generates and allocates new utilities. The average allocations
evolve according to a doubly (over time and space) averaging
algorithm. We study conditions under which the average allo-
cations reach consensus to any point within a predefined target
set even in the presence of adversarial disturbances. Motivations
arise in the context of coalitional games with transferable utilities
(TU) where the target set is any set of allocations that makes
the grand coalition stable.
at each time, every player i) proposes a new bid based on
the average utilities produced up to that time, ii) adjusts such
allocations based on the inputs received from its neighbors, and
iii) generates and allocates new utilities. The average allocations
evolve according to a doubly (over time and space) averaging
algorithm. We study conditions under which the average allo-
cations reach consensus to any point within a predefined target
set even in the presence of adversarial disturbances. Motivations
arise in the context of coalitional games with transferable utilities
(TU) where the target set is any set of allocations that makes
the grand coalition stable.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 3107-3132 |
| Journal | IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control |
| Volume | 60 |
| Issue number | 11 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2015 |
| Externally published | Yes |