Do Normative Judgements Aim to Represent the World?

Bart Streumer*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Many philosophers think that normative judgements do not aim to represent the world. In this paper, I argue that this view is incompatible with the thought that when two people make conflicting normative judgements, at most one of these judgements is correct. I argue that this shows that normative judgements do aim to represent the world.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)450-470
Number of pages21
JournalRatio
Volume26
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Dec-2013

Keywords

  • Non-cognitivism
  • Error theory
  • Irrealism

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