Does believing something to be fiction allow a form of moral licencing or a ‘fictive pass’ in understanding others’ actions?

Jacqueline Thompson; Ben Teasdale; Evert van Emde Boas; Felix Budelmann; Sophie Duncan; Laurie Maguire; Robin Dunbar

doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1159866

Does believing something to be fiction allow a form of moral licencing or a ‘fictive pass’ in understanding others’ actions?

Jacqueline Thompson
, Ben Teasdale
, Evert van Emde Boas
, Felix Budelmann
, Sophie Duncan
, Laurie Maguire
, Robin Dunbar^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

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Abstract

Original language	English
Article number	1159866
Journal	Frontiers in Psychology
Volume	14
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1159866
Publication status	Published - 2023
Externally published	Yes

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10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1159866Licence: CC BY

Frontiers in Psychology 01 frontiersin.org Does believing something to be fiction allow a form of moral licencing or a ‘fictive pass’ in understanding others’ actions?Final publisher's version, 696 KBLicence: CC BY

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@article{f54165df93de40c0a8d0bdb5e0070f40,

title = "Does believing something to be fiction allow a form of moral licencing or a {\textquoteleft}fictive pass{\textquoteright} in understanding others{\textquoteright} actions?",

author = "Jacqueline Thompson and Ben Teasdale and \{van Emde Boas\}, Evert and Felix Budelmann and Sophie Duncan and Laurie Maguire and Robin Dunbar",

note = "Publisher Copyright: Copyright {\textcopyright} 2023 Thompson, Teasdale, van Emde Boas, Budelmann, Duncan, Maguire and Dunbar.",

year = "2023",

doi = "10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1159866",

language = "English",

volume = "14",

journal = "Frontiers in Psychology",