Abstract
A central concept for understanding social dilemma behavior is the efficacy of an actor's cooperative behavior in terms of increasing group well-being. We report a decision and game theoretical analysis of efficacy in step-level public goods (SPGs). Previous research shows a positive relation between efficacy and contributions to SPGs and explains this relation by a purely motivational account. We show, however, that from a decision and game theory perspective an increasing relationship is not general, but only follows from very specific assumptions about players' information and beliefs. We offer 3 examples of how the predicted efficacy-contribution relation depends on players' information and beliefs. We discuss the implications of our results for the social psychology of efficacy in social dilemmas.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 285-301 |
Number of pages | 17 |
Journal | The Journal of Mathematical Sociology |
Volume | 38 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2-Oct-2014 |
Keywords
- beliefs
- step-level public goods
- information
- social dilemmas
- efficacy
- Bayesian equilibrium
- SOCIAL DILEMMAS
- INTERGROUP COMPETITION
- COLLECTIVE ACTION
- GROUP-SIZE
- PROVISION
- COOPERATION
- COMMUNICATION
- COMMITMENT