Empirical progress and nomic truth approximation revisited

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Abstract

In my From Instrumentalism to Constructive Realism (2000) I have shown how an instrumentalist account of empirical progress can be related to nomic truth approximation. However, it was assumed that a strong notion of nomic theories was needed for that analysis. In this paper it is shown, in terms of truth
and falsity content, that the analysis already applies when, in line with scientific common sense, nomic theories are merely assumed to exclude certain conceptual possibilities as nomic possibilities.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)64-72
JournalStudies in History and Philosophy of Science. Part A
Volume46
Issue numberiii
Publication statusPublished - 2014

Keywords

  • Empirical progress Nomic truth approximation Truth content Falsity content Instrumentalism Realism Conceptual possibilities Nomic possibilities

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