Epistemic justification and epistemic luck

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    Abstract

    Among epistemologists, it is not uncommon to relate various forms of epistemic luck to the vexed debate between internalists and externalists. But there are many internalism/externalism debates in epistemology, and it is not always clear how these debates relate to each other. In the present paper I investigate the relation between epistemic luck and prominent internalist and externalist accounts of epistemic justification. I argue that the dichotomy between internalist and externalist concepts of justification can be characterized in terms of epistemic luck. Whereas externalist theories of justification are incompatible with veritic luck but not with reflective luck, the converse is true for internalist theories of justification. These results are found to explain and cohere with some recent findings from elsewhere in epistemology, and support a surprising picture of justification, on which internalism and externalism are complementary rather than contradictory positions.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)3821-3836
    JournalSynthese
    Volume195
    Issue number9
    Early online date13-Feb-2017
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2018

    Keywords

    • Luck
    • Pritchard
    • Internalism
    • Externalism
    • Justification
    • Refelctive luck
    • Veretic luck
    • KNOWLEDGE
    • INTERNALISM
    • RELIABILISM
    • ACCOUNT
    • TRUTH

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