Epstein on Groups: Virtues of the Status Account

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Epstein compares models of group agents that focus on their internal organization to models that focus on the statuses they have. He argues that status models are inadequate because agency is not something that can be attributed by fiat. Even if this is true, however, certain agential powers can be attributed to group agents. I argue that Epstein's arguments stand to benefit a lot from recognizing that some group agents have statuses and constitute corporate agents. For instance, only corporate agents can exist without having members.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)185-197
Number of pages13
JournalInquiry-An interdisciplinary journal of philosophy
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 15-Feb-2019


  • Epstein
  • group agents
  • status account

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