Explanatory Unification in Experimental Philosophy: Let's Keep It Real

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Abstract

Experimental philosophers have discovered a large number of asymmetries in our intuitions about philosophically significant notions. Often those intuitions turned out to be sensitive to normative factors. Whereas optimists have insisted on a unified explanation of these findings, pessimists have argued that it is impossible to formulate a single factor explanation. I defend the intermediate position according to which unification is possible to some extent, but should be pursued within limits. The key issue that I address is how it is possible to set such limits in a way that is true to the phenomena.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)219-242
Number of pages24
JournalReview of Philosophy and Psychology
Volume10
Issue number1
Early online dateMar-2019
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 21-Apr-2019

Keywords

  • INTENTIONAL ACTION
  • INDIVIDUAL-DIFFERENCES
  • JUDGMENTS
  • ACCOUNT
  • INTUITIONS
  • BELIEF
  • BLAME

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