Abstract
A set of objects is to be divided fairly among agents with different tastes, modeled by additive utility-functions. An agent is allowed to share a bounded number of objects between two or more agents in order to attain fairness.
The paper studies various notions of fairness, such as proportionality, envy-freeness, equitability, and consensus. We analyze the run-time complexity of finding a fair allocation with a given number of sharings under several restrictions on the agents’ valuations, such as: binary generalized-binary and non-degenerate.
The paper studies various notions of fairness, such as proportionality, envy-freeness, equitability, and consensus. We analyze the run-time complexity of finding a fair allocation with a given number of sharings under several restrictions on the agents’ valuations, such as: binary generalized-binary and non-degenerate.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Algorithmic Game Theory |
| Subtitle of host publication | 17th International Symposium, SAGT 2024, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, September 3-6, 2024, Proceedings. |
| Editors | Guido Schäfer, Carmine Ventre |
| Publisher | Springer |
| Pages | 89–107 |
| Number of pages | 19 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 978-3-031-71033-9 |
| ISBN (Print) | 978-3-031-71032-2 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2024 |
Publication series
| Name | Lecture Notes in Computer Science |
|---|---|
| Publisher | Springer |
| Volume | 15156 |
| ISSN (Print) | 0302-9743 |
| ISSN (Electronic) | 1611-3349 |