Free will as a higher-level phenomenon?

Alexander Gebharter*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)
53 Downloads (Pure)


List (2014, 2019) has recently argued for a particular view of free will as a higher-level phenomenon compatible with determinism. According to List, one could refute his account by showing that determinism at the physical level implies the impossibility of doing otherwise at the agential level. This paper takes up that challenge. Based on assumptions to which List's approach is committed, I provide a simple probabilistic model that establishes the connection between physical determinism and the impossibility of doing otherwise at the agential level that is needed to refute free will as a higher-level phenomenon.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)177-187
Number of pages11
JournalThought: A Journal of Philosophy
Issue number3
Early online date18-Aug-2020
Publication statusPublished - Sep-2020


  • determinism
  • free will
  • levels
  • probabilistic models
  • the possibility of doing otherwise

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