## Abstract

From 1929 onwards, C. I. Lewis defended the foundationalist claim that judgements of the form 'x is probable' only make sense if one assumes there to be a ground y that is certain (where x and y may be beliefs, propositions, or events). Without this assumption, Lewis argues, the probability of x could not be anything other than zero. Hans Reichenbach repeatedly contested Lewis's idea, calling it "a remnant of rationalism". The last move in this debate was a challenge by Lewis, defying Reichenbach to produce a regress of probability values that yields a number other than zero. Reichenbach never took up the challenge, but we will meet it on his behalf, as it were. By presenting a series converging to a limit, we demonstrate that x can have a definite and computable probability, even if its justification consists of an infinite number of steps. Next we show the invalidity of a recent riposte of foundationalists that this limit of the series can be the ground of justification. Finally we discuss the question where justification can come from if not from a ground.

Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 113-124 |

Number of pages | 12 |

Journal | Synthese |

Volume | 181 |

Issue number | 1 |

DOIs | |

Publication status | Published - Jul-2011 |

## Keywords

- Foundationalism
- Reichenbach
- Probability
- PROBABILITY
- DEBATE
- CERTAINTY