How internal and external supervisors influence employees' self-serving decisions

Melanie de Waal, Floor Rink, Janka Stoker

Research output: Working paperAcademic


The current investigation examined the effects of internal and external supervisors (i.e., formally installed institutions that hold employees accountable for their actions) on employees’ self-serving decisions. In two studies, it was found that internal supervisors reduced self-serving decisions more strongly than external supervisors did because they hold more position power over employees. The findings further suggest that the presence of both supervisors did not provide additive advantages, as employees primarily responded to internal supervisors. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these findings.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationAmsterdam
PublisherDe Nederlandsche Bank
Number of pages37
Publication statusPublished - 27-Feb-2015

Publication series

NameDNB paper series
PublisherDe Nederlandsche Bank


  • self-serving decisions
  • internal supervision
  • external supervision
  • power bases

Cite this