How Russia’s war in Ukraine shifted protean power in EU–Russia relations

This paper explores how the agility of Russia and of the EU to ‘exercise’ protean power in their bilateral relations has shifted between two critical junctures: Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Drawing on Katzenstein and Seybert’s theory, protean power is approached along its two dimensions: the agility of actors to deal with the unexpected through improvisation and innovation as well as the capacity to generate uncertainty for others. It is argued that the capacity to exert protean power has shifted drastically between the two points of comparison. In 2014 Russia pursued a strategy of punching above its weight, acting by surprise and by stealth through the use of asymmetrical means. The EU struggled to find an answer to this policy of generating radical uncertainty. It relied on conventional foreign policy tools and ended up with an ambiguous policy of both confrontation and business as usual. In 2022, the Kremlin changed its strategy towards a full-scale military war against Ukraine, taking away all doubt about its irridentist ambitions. The invasion generated a sense of urgency, leading to strong unity and determination inside the EU and resulting in unprecedented, innovative policies and a higher agility to respond to Russia’s aggression. Despite the huge threats posed by the war, Russia, from its side, lost considerable capacity to produce radical uncertainty to undermine the EU’s control power.