Impermissible Self‑Rationalizing Pessimism: In Defence of a Pragmatic Ethics of Belief

Nikolaj Nottelmann*, Boudewijn de Bruin

*Corresponding author for this work

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We present an argument against a standard evidentialist position on the ethics of belief. We argue that sometimes a person merits criticism for holding a belief even when that belief is well supported by her evidence in any relevant sense. We show how our argument advances the case for anti-evidentialism (pragmatism) in the light of other arguments presented in the recent literature, and respond to a set of possible evidentialist rejoinders.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)257-274
Number of pages18
Early online date4-Apr-2019
Publication statusPublished - 2021

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