In Defense of the Rational Credibility Account: A Reply to Casalegno

Igor Douven; Christoph Kelp

doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.2012.01302.x

In Defense of the Rational Credibility Account: A Reply to Casalegno

Igor Douven^*, Christoph Kelp

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

A majority of philosophers nowadays hold that the practice of assertion is governed by the rule that one must assert only what one knows. In his last published paper, Paolo Casalegno sides with this view and criticizes rival accounts of assertion on which rational belief or rational credibility will do for warranted assertion. We take issue with Casalegno's criticisms and find them wanting.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	289-297
Number of pages	9
Journal	Dialectica
Volume	66
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2012.01302.x
Publication status	Published - Jun-2012

Keywords

ASSERTION
KNOWLEDGE
EXPLANATION
INFERENCE

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In Defense of the Rational Credibility Account A Reply to Casalegno
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abstract = "A majority of philosophers nowadays hold that the practice of assertion is governed by the rule that one must assert only what one knows. In his last published paper, Paolo Casalegno sides with this view and criticizes rival accounts of assertion on which rational belief or rational credibility will do for warranted assertion. We take issue with Casalegno's criticisms and find them wanting.",

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KW - KNOWLEDGE

KW - EXPLANATION

KW - INFERENCE

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In Defense of the Rational Credibility Account: A Reply to Casalegno

Abstract

Keywords

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