Abstract
Institutions can be strong or weak. But what does this mean? Equilibrium theories equate institutions with behavioural regularities. In contrast, rule theories explicate them in terms of a standard that people are supposed to meet. I propose that, when an institution is weak, a discrepancy exists between the regularity and the standard or rule. To capture this discrepancy, I present a hybrid theory, the Rules-and-Equilibria Theory. According to this theory, institutions are rule-governed behavioural regularities. The Rules-and-Equilibria Theory provides the basis for two measures of institutional strength. First, institutions that pertain to coordination games solve problems of information. Their strength is primarily a matter of the expected degree of compliance. Second, institutions that concern mixed-motive games solve problems of motivation. Their strength can be measured in terms of the weight people attribute to its rule.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 354-371 |
Number of pages | 18 |
Journal | Economics and Philosophy |
Volume | 38 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Nov-2022 |
Keywords
- Institution
- normative belief
- normative expectation
- social norm
- social practice