Interpersonal coordination and epistemic support for intentions with we-content

O. Roy

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2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper I study intentions of the form 'I intend that we ...', that is, intentions with a we-content, and their role in interpersonal coordination. I focus on the notion of epistemic support for such intentions. Using tools from epistemic game theory and epistemic logic, I cast doubt on whether such support guarantees the other agents' conditional mediation in the achievement of such intentions, something that appears important if intentions with a we-content are to count as genuine intentions. I then formulate a stronger version of epistemic support, one that does indeed ensure the required mediation, but I then argue that it rests on excessively strong informational conditions. In view of this I provide an alternative set of conditions that are jointly sufficient for coordination in games, and I argue that these conditions constitute a plausible alternative to the proposed notion of epistemic support.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)345-367
Number of pages23
JournalEconomics and Philosophy
Volume26
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Nov-2010

Keywords

  • INTERACTIVE EPISTEMOLOGY
  • EQUILIBRIUM

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