TY - UNPB
T1 - Joint liability lending
T2 - a note
AU - Gangopadhyay, Shubhashis
AU - Lensink, Robert
N1 - Relation: http://som.rug.nl/
date_submitted:2001
Rights: Graduate School/Research Institute, Systems, Organisations and Management (SOM)
PY - 2001
Y1 - 2001
N2 - This note argues that the joint liability contracting equilibria worked out in Ghatak(2000) have a serious drawback in that, even though incentive compatible ex ante, they violate ex post rationality. For such contracts to be feasible, banks should be able to extract more under failure than under success. However, when we alllow for this, it may help explain some important empirical observations on joint liability lending.
AB - This note argues that the joint liability contracting equilibria worked out in Ghatak(2000) have a serious drawback in that, even though incentive compatible ex ante, they violate ex post rationality. For such contracts to be feasible, banks should be able to extract more under failure than under success. However, when we alllow for this, it may help explain some important empirical observations on joint liability lending.
M3 - Working paper
BT - Joint liability lending
PB - s.n.
ER -