Justification by an infinity of conditional probabilities

David Atkinson*, Jeanne Peijnenburg

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

13 Citations (Scopus)
248 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

Today it is generally assumed that epistemic justification comes in degrees. The consequences, however, have not been adequately appreciated. In this paper we show that the assumption invalidates some venerable attacks on infinitism: once we accept that epistemic justification is gradual, an infinitist stance makes perfect sense. It is only without the assumption that infinitism runs into difficulties.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)183-193
Number of pages11
JournalNotre Dame Journal of Formal Logic
Volume50
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2009

Keywords

  • probabilistic justification
  • infinitism
  • foundationalism
  • conditional and unconditional probabilities
  • COHERENCE
  • BELIEF

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