Abstract
Both Kant and Husserl claim to endorse a form of transcendental idealism which includes some sufficient form of realism in itself. This chapter offers a systematic comparison of this claim for both authors. The first half of this chapter discusses (i) Kant’s criticism of Cartesian skepticism, (ii) his identification of transcendental realism as a fallacious source of that position, and (iii) his own solution based on the fusion of empirical realism with transcendental idealism. I subsequently discuss (iv) whether the negative concept of noumenon Kant accepts obscures this position, and I argue that it need not. Turning to Husserl, the second part discusses his criticism of Cartesian skepticism and the problem of the relation between the intentional and the real object. I argue that Husserl’s position resembles Kant’s on important points. I then turn to Husserl’s concept of a “world beyond ours” in Ideas I and argue that Husserl’s account of the material counter-sense, but also logical possibility of a world beyond consciousness, mirrors Kant’s negative noumenon. I conclude that, disregarding details of their respective proof structures, both views on transcendental idealism are similar in important respects, also regarding the possibility of a noumenal world.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Husserl, Kant and Transcendental Phenomenology |
Editors | Iulian Apostolescu, Claudia Serban |
Publisher | De Gruyter |
Pages | 163-188 |
Number of pages | 26 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 978-3-11-056296-5 |
ISBN (Print) | 978-3-11-056292-7, 978-3-11-056304-7 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1-Jan-2020 |