Kant and Husserl on Overcoming Skeptical Idealism through Transcendental Idealism

Both Kant and Husserl claim to endorse a form of transcendental idealism which includes some sufficient form of realism in itself. This chapter offers a systematic comparison of this claim for both authors. The first half of this chapter discusses (i) Kant’s criticism of Cartesian skepticism, (ii) his identification of transcendental realism as a fallacious source of that position, and (iii) his own solution based on the fusion of empirical realism with transcendental idealism. I subsequently discuss (iv) whether the negative concept of noumenon Kant accepts obscures this position, and I argue that it need not. Turning to Husserl, the second part discusses his criticism of Cartesian skepticism and the problem of the relation between the intentional and the real object. I argue that Husserl’s position resembles Kant’s on important points. I then turn to Husserl’s concept of a “world beyond ours” in Ideas I and argue that Husserl’s account of the material counter-sense, but also logical possibility of a world beyond consciousness, mirrors Kant’s negative noumenon. I conclude that, disregarding details of their respective proof structures, both views on transcendental idealism are similar in important respects, also regarding the possibility of a noumenal world.