Kinds of Replication: Examining the Meanings of “Conceptual Replication” and “Direct Replication”

Maarten Derksen*, Jill Morawski

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

27 Citations (Scopus)
86 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

Although psychology’s recent crisis has been attributed to various scientific practices, it has come to be called a “replication crisis,” prompting extensive appraisals of this putatively crucial scientific practice. These have yielded disagreements over what kind of replication is to be preferred and what phenomena are being explored, yet the proposals are all grounded in a conventional philosophy of science. This article proposes another avenue that invites moving beyond a discovery metaphor of science to rethink research as enabling realities and to consider how empirical findings enact or perform a reality. An enactment perspective appreciates multiple, dynamic realities and science as producing different entities, enactments that ever encounter differences, uncertainties, and precariousness. The axioms of an enactment perspective are described and employed to more fully understand the two kinds of replication that predominate in the crisis disputes. Although the enactment perspective described here is a relatively recent development in philosophy of science and science studies, some of its core axioms are not new to psychology, and the article concludes by revisiting psychologists’ previous calls to apprehend the dynamism of psychological reality to appreciate how scientific practices actively and unavoidably participate in performativity of reality.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1490-1505
Number of pages16
JournalPerspectives on Psychological Science
Volume17
Issue number5
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1-Sept-2022

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