Liberal egalitarianism beyond methodological atomism

Some readings of Rawls’ Theory of Justice rely on the methodological assumptions of rational choice theory, conceptualizing individuals in atomistic ways. They facilitated interpretations that allow for high degrees of inequality. This chapter argues that the view of human nature implicit in rational choice methodologies is insufficiently relational and overlooks the ways in which the value of an individual’s resources, welfare, or opportunities is co-determined by the societal distribution of resources, welfare, or opportunities. It also fails to consider how resources can serve as sources of societal power. By drawing on sociological and psychological insights and adopting a relational view of social meanings, resources, and political power, one arrives at a more plausible picture of what liberal-egalitarian justice requires. One upshot is that they provide a defence of a relative version of limitarianism, not only as a ‘problem-driven’ account for but as an ideal theory of justice.