Abstract
Recently, philosophers have drawn on tools from game theory to explore
behavior in Hobbes’ state of nature (Vanderschraaf in Econ Philos 22:243–279,
2006; Chung in J Am Philos Assoc 1:485–508, 2015). I take a similar approach and
argue the Lockean state of nature is best conceived of as a conflictual coordination
game. I also discuss Nozick’s famous claim regarding the emergence of the state
and argue the path to the minimal state is blocked by a hitherto unnoticed free-rider
problem. Finally, I argue that on my representation of the Lockean state of nature
both widespread conflict and lasting peace are possible. This, I contend, is in line
with one popular interpretation of Locke (Simmons in Polit Theory 17:449–470,
1989).
behavior in Hobbes’ state of nature (Vanderschraaf in Econ Philos 22:243–279,
2006; Chung in J Am Philos Assoc 1:485–508, 2015). I take a similar approach and
argue the Lockean state of nature is best conceived of as a conflictual coordination
game. I also discuss Nozick’s famous claim regarding the emergence of the state
and argue the path to the minimal state is blocked by a hitherto unnoticed free-rider
problem. Finally, I argue that on my representation of the Lockean state of nature
both widespread conflict and lasting peace are possible. This, I contend, is in line
with one popular interpretation of Locke (Simmons in Polit Theory 17:449–470,
1989).
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 705-726 |
| Number of pages | 22 |
| Journal | Philosophical Studies |
| Volume | 177 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| Early online date | 20-Nov-2018 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2020 |
Keywords
- social contract theory
- state of natre
- locke
- nozick
- game theory