Monitoring Job Offer Decisions, Punishments, Exit to Work, and Job Quality

Gerard J. van den Berg*, Johan Vikstrom*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

50 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Unemployment insurance systems include the monitoring of unemployed workers and punitive sanctions if job search requirements are violated. We analyze the causal effect of sanctions on the ensuing job quality, notably on wages and occupational level. We use Swedish data and estimate duration models dealing with selection on unobservables. We also develop a theoretical job search model that monitors job offer rejection versus job search effort. The empirical results show that, after a sanction, the wage rate is lower and individuals move more often to a part-time job and a lower occupational level, incurring human capital losses.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)284-334
Number of pages51
JournalScandinavian Journal of Economics
Volume116
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr-2014
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • J44
  • wage
  • Offer rejection
  • H75
  • D83
  • J62
  • J30
  • search effort
  • K42
  • C21
  • C41
  • J31
  • sanction
  • J65
  • J64
  • unemployment duration
  • J68
  • E65
  • UNEMPLOYMENT-INSURANCE
  • SWEDISH EVIDENCE
  • TRANSITION RATE
  • DURATION
  • SANCTIONS

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